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INTRODUCTION
OnJanuary 19, 1981, the United States entered into an executive
agreement' with the Iranian government that provided for the release
of American citizens who had been held hostage in Iran for 444 days. 2
The Agreement, executed by President Jimmy Carter, also provided
for the repatriation of Iranian assets attached to U.S. courts, the termi-
nation of litigation between Iran and U.S. nationals, and the redirec-
tion of those claims into binding international arbitration.3 In the
following months, President Carter and President Reagan issued a se-
ries of Executive Orders authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury,
Don Regan, to enforce the tenets of the Executive Agreement-
named the "Algiers Accords" for Algeria's involvement as a forum for
negotiations. 4 Inevitably, parties with injured financial interests ob-
jected to the President's authority to remove nearly $8 billion of Ira-
1 The Agreement was embodied in two declarations of the Republic of Algeria.
The declarations are referred to popularly as the Algiers Accords. See infra note 13.
2 In November 1979, a terrorist student group called the "Muslim Student Fol-
lowers of Imam's Policy," attacked and took over the United States Embassy in Te-
hran. Fifty-two United States diplomatic and consular personnel were taken hostage
and detained for 444 days. The day after the raid of the Embassy, the Iranian Foreign
Minister and the Ayatollah Khomeini publicly endorsed the attack. However, the ac-
tions of the terrorists were finally officially attributed to the Iranian government only
when the Ayatollah issued public statements that the hostages would not be released
until the United States deported the Shah and his property to Iran. See Concerning
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3 (May 24). On January 19, 1981-the last day of the Carter Administration-
the United States and Iran signed the Algiers Accords. That Agreement provided for
the release of the American hostages and the establishment of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal at the Hague. See Symposium, On The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 16
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 667 (1984).
3 See infra note 13.
4 Because Iran refused to negotiate with the United States directly, the Iranian
majlis (governing religious council) designated the Government of Algeria as the offi-
cial mediator through which all official negotiations would be conducted.
Because Iran would not sign an "agreement" with "the Great Satan," the
United States negotiators drafted two "declarations," to be issued by the gov-
ernment of Algeria and to be "adhered to" by both Iran and the United
States. The United States negotiators conveyed drafts of these Declarations
to the Algerian intermediaries, who then conveyed them to the Iranian
negotiators. The Iranian negotiators would respond with various comments
and demands, and the United States negotiators would revise the Declara-
tions in light of those demands.
Nancy Amoury Combs, Carter, Reagan, and Khomeini: Presidential Transitions and Inter-
national Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 303, 321-22 (2000) (citing Roberts P. Owen, The Final
Negotiation and Release in Algiers, inAMERiCAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN 297, 311, 314-15 (Paul
H. Kreisberg ed., 1985)).
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nian assets from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Consequently, the
courts were called upon to sanction the Executive Orders or reject the
President's actions and thereby thrust the United States into breach of
the Executive Agreement with Iran. The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in an expedited schedule to resolve the constitutionality of the
Orders as applied to suspended prejudgment attachments against the
Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, and several Iranian banks, by the Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California on behalf of peti-
tioner Dames & Moore. 5 The Court issued a unanimous opinion in
favor of the Orders' constitutionality less than one month from grant-
ing certiorari. Then-Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the
Court, explained:
We granted certiorari before judgment in this case, and set an expe-
dited briefing and argument schedule, because lower courts had
reached conflicting conclusions on the validity of the President's
actions and, as the Solicitor General informed us, unless the Gov-
ernment acted by July 19, 1981, Iran could consider the United
States to be in breach of the Executive Agreement.
6
The sense of urgency suggested by Justice Rehnquist's characteriza-
tion of the circumstances under which the case was heard might ex-
plain the apparent brevity and lack of depth of the opinion. The
unanimity and terseness of the opinion might also suggest a Court
unwilling to pursue any legal conclusion that would compromise the
President's authority in foreign affairs. The United States had already
surrendered almost $8 billion in Iranian assets on January 20, 1981,
the day of President Reagan's inauguration, in exchange for the al-
ready-executed release of the hostages. A Supreme Court decision
that invalidated the Agreement made by the Executive Branch could
have done considerable damage to the President's ability to deal with
foreign sovereigns.
Although Dames & Moore was likely borne of political pressure
rather than principle, the decision has nevertheless become a part of
the mainstream executive-powers jurisprudence. The federal courts
have appealed to the Dames & Moore decision as a clear application of
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer7 and Field v. Clark,8 instead of
regarding it as a politically motivated legal aberration. 9 The result has
5 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
6 Id. at 660.
7 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Youngstown is often referred to as "The Steel Seizure
Case."
8 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
9 See American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003); Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Ministry of Def. of the
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been the codification of a distorted understanding of congressional
delegation and a limitless field of executive action in the context of a
unilaterally proclaimed "national emergency."
What Dames & Moore means today is that there is functionally no
limiting principle applicable to executive orders where any congres-
sional act at all-offered by the government or discovered by the
courts-might be interpreted to authorize implicitly or explicitly the
President's prerogative to do as he sees fit once he has declared a state
of national emergency. In the wake of September 11 th, some scholars
have interpreted the Executive Orders authorized by a joint resolu-
tion of Congress in October 2001, charging the Executive with the
broad task of redressing the terrorist attacks visited on the United
States, as announcing the presidential omnipotence an injudicious
federal judiciary courted with decisions like Dames & Moore. Address-
ing the issue of military tribunals created by an Executive Order is-
sued by President Bush' 0 for the purpose of trying enemy combatants
detained during the United States' "War on Terrorism," Professors
Laurence Tribe and Neal Katyal contend that:
To fuse [the] three [constitutional] functions [of government]
under one man's ultimate rule, and to administer the resulting sim-
ulacrum ofjustice in a system of tribunals created by that very same
authority, is to mock the very notion of constitutionalism and to
make light of any aspiration to live by the rule of law.'1
However, although scholars proclaiming constitutional crises sur-
rounding the Supreme Court's "unwillingness" or "failure" to articu-
late limiting principles for the President as Commander in Chief
appeal to "fundamental principles" of our constitutional structure,
their arguments often rely on mutable policy considerations. The ex-
ecutive-powers cases within the Dames & Moore "family" imply the con-
clusion that the President has inherent unilateral power to control all
government functions in the area of national security. Not surpris-
ingly, the Court has never reached this conclusion, but opinions such
as Dames & Moore have rendered opposition to executive actions per-
taining to national security functionally toothless.
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc., 887 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1989); Elec. Data Sys.
Corp. Iran v. Soc. Sec. Org. of the Gov't of Iran, 651 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1981); Roe-
der v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.D.C. 2002).
10 See Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism §§ 3(a), 4(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, at 57,833 (Nov. 13,
2001).
11 Neal K_ Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Mili-
tary Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1259 (2002) (arguing that military tribunals are only
constitutionally appropriate in a time of declared war).
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This Note contends that the failure of the Court to articulate any
meaningful limiting principles for executive power in the areas of na-
tional security and foreign affairs is symptomatic of a larger constitu-
tional problem. More often than not, the Court disposes of the Dames
& Moore-esque constitutional challenge by identifying a congressional
source of authority. Given the breadth and malleability of the tradi-
tional canons of statutory interpretation, it is almost impossible to im-
agine a realistic scenario where the Court could not identify a
congressional source of authority. The Supreme Court's and the legal
academy's inability to conceive coherent separation of powers limita-
tions on Congress's authority to delegate power has silenced argu-
ment beyond the point of congressional sanction. If one contends
that our constitutional system is incompatible with an understanding
of executive authority as functionally without limits in any area, then
similar limitations must be applicable to Congress's authority to dele-
gate power to the Executive. However, the current impotence of the
so-called "nondelegation doctrine"12 provides no standards to bind
short-sighted Justices to immutable principles of constitutional struc-
ture. The Dames & Moore decision is emblematic of the flaws in the
Court's delegation jurisprudence. In that decision the Supreme
Court allowed Congress to acquiesce to unilateral executive use of the
power vested exclusively in Congress by the Constitution to "make ex-
ceptions" to the jurisdiction of the Article III courts. This Note con-
tends that Congress may not constitutionally delegate this "exceptions
power" implicitly (e.g., by acquiescence) or explicitly to the Executive.
Part I of this Note reviews the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the power exercised by President Reagan in Executive Order No.
12,294 and explains why the suspension of a class of party-defined
pending litigation must be interpreted as a modification to the juris-
diction of Article III courts, and thus, an exercise of the exceptions
power. Part II considers how the Court has interpreted Congress's
authority to delegate power given a liberal interpretation of the mod-
ern administrative state. Finally, this Note proposes a judicially man-
ageable nondelegation doctrine based on a dual understanding of
constitutional powers, and concludes that the type of power exercised
in Executive Order No. 12,294 was in fact that which Congress cannot
implicitly or explicitly delegate to the Executive.
12 In fact, Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule go so far as to argue "that
there is no such nondelegation doctrine: A statutory grant of authority to the execu-
tive branch or other agents never effects a delegation of legislative power." Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv.
1721, 1721 (2002).
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I. THE NATURE OF THE POWER EXERCISED BY EXECUTIVE
ORDER No. 12,294
Under the Algiers Accords, 13 the United States agreed to termi-
nate all litigation between United States nationals and the Iranian gov-
ernment and to redirect those claims into binding international
arbitration. Executive Order No. 12,294,14 issued to effectuate the
agreements made with the Iranian government, obligated the United
States
to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving
claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its
state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained
therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and
to bring about the termination of such claims through binding
arbitration. 15
This Note will not address the "nullification of prejudgment attach-
ments" provision because, although it effectively precludes the pend-
ing litigation from proceeding, it does not remove the litigation from
the jurisdiction of Article III courts and, therefore, only arguably gives
13 The Algiers Accords were composed of the Declaration of the Government of
the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,Jan. 19, 1981, U.S.-Iran, 81 DEP'T ST.
BULL., Feb. 1981, at 1, 1-3, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 3, 3-8 (1983) [hereinafter
General Declaration]; and the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Jan. 19, 1981, U.S.-Iran, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1981, at 3, 3-4, reprinted in 1 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R. 9, 9-12 (1983) [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration]. The General
Declaration was dispensed with in the Claims Settlement Declaration. These docu-
ments together constitute the "Algiers Accords." The Algiers Accords are an execu-
tive agreement between the United States and Iran. For a history of the Agreement
with Iran negotiated in Algeria, see Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMIJ.
INT'L L. 1 (1981). Petitioner Dames & Moore described the Algiers Accords in its
Brief in the following passage:
On January 19, 1981, President Carter entered into the so-called Algerian
Declarations, in which he agreed that, in return for Iran's releasing
America's hostages, the President would undertake, inter alia, to terminate
all lawsuits of American citizens pending in the United States against Iran
and its agencies and controlled entities, to nullify all attachments and judg-
ments obtained by American citizens in such lawsuits, and to transfer out of
the country all Iranian property ....
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (No. 20-2078)
(citation omitted).
14 Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (Feb. 24, 1981).
15 Id.
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rise to a "takings" challenge 16 under the Fifth Amendment.17 This
Note will focus exclusively on the nondelegation issue, that is, on pro-
visions that order the termination of all legal proceedings and pro-
hibit further litigation.
When President Reagan ratified the Algiers Accords in February
1981 through operation of a series of executive orders, 8 he ordered
that pending litigation involving "Iran and its state enterprises ...
shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of
the United States." 19 Furthermore, President Reagan's Executive Or-
der specified that "[t] he suspension of any particular claim terminates
if the [International] Claims Tribunal determines that it has no juris-
diction over the claim."20 Jurisdiction over claims involving foreign
sovereigns and American citizens are constitutionally vested in the Ar-
ticle III courts.21 By removing claims involving "Iran and its state en-
terprises" from the jurisdiction of Article III courts and expressly
placing those claims under the jurisdiction of an international claims
tribunal, Executive Order No. 12,294 effectively made an exception to
Article III "diversity jurisdiction."22 The Order very explicitly in-
tended to affect which courts had jurisdiction over these particular
"party-defined" claims by making their suspension contingent on the
Claims Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under the Algiers Accords. 23
Presumably, if the Claims Tribunal's failure to exercise jurisdiction
over a particular claim means that it is not suspended in courts of the
16 For more on Fifth Amendment "takings" challenges to the U.S.-Iran Accords,
see Peter L. Fitzgerald, "If Property Rights Were Treated Like Human Rights, They Could
Never Get Away With This": Blacklisting and Due Process in U.S. Economic Sanctions Pro-
grams, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 73 (1999); Note, The U.S.-Iran Accords and the Taking Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, 68 VA. L. REv. 1537 (1982); R. David Weaver, Comment, Dames &
Moore v. Regan: Was It Fair?, 34 BAYLOR L. Rv. 283 (1982).
17 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("Nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
18 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,279, 46 Fed. Reg. 7919 (Jan. 19, 1981); Exec. Or-
der No. 12,280, 46 Fed. Reg. 7921 (Jan. 19, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,281, 46 Fed.
Reg. 7923 (Jan. 19, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (Feb. 24,
1981). Executive Order No. 12,294 contains the relevant provisions about the suspen-
sion of pending claims and the nullification of attachments and final judgments. See
Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. at 14,111.
19 Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. at 14,111.
20 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 645, 666 (1981) (citing Exec. Order No.
12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. at 14,111).
21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Judicial Power shall extend to ... Contro-
versies between . . .a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.").
22 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (2000).
23 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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United States, it follows that jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States is contingent upon the operation of Executive Order No.
12,294. Thus, the issue of suspension is exclusively a question of
jurisdiction.
A. A Summary of the Court's Interpretation of Executive
Order No. 12,294
In Dames & Moore v. Regan,24 the Supreme Court rejected the
proposition that the President had circumscribed the jurisdiction of
Article III courts by suspending pending claims between U.S. nation-
als and Iran.25 Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the Court,
described the historically broad arena of executive power in the area
of national security. The opinion implied a single precedent created
by the accumulation of two centuries of congressional delegation of
presidential foreign affairs powers. 26 The government claimed that
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) 27 and the
"Hostage Act" of 186828 expressly authorized the President to settle,
nullify or void pending litigation. As such, the government argued,
the Court should presume that the actions were proper unless the
"Federal Government as an undivided whole lack[ed] [the] power." 29
Petitioner Dames & Moore made the contrary claim that Congress
24 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
25 Id. at 678-86.
26 Justice Rehnquist discussed the difficulty of interpreting the historical develop-
ment of presidential powers in the following passage:
The questions presented by this case touch fundamentally upon the matter
in which our Republic is to be governed. Throughout the nearly two centu-
ries of our Nation's existence under the Constitution, this subject has gener-
ated considerable debate. We have had the benefit of commentators such as
John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison writing in The Federalist
Papers at the Nation's very inception, the benefit of astute foreign observers
of our system such as Alexis de Tocqueville and James Bryce writing during
the first century of the Nation's existence, and the benefit of many other
treatises as well as more than 400 volumes of reports of decisions of this
Court. As these writings reveal it is doubtless both futile and perhaps dan-
gerous to find any epigrammatical explanation of how this country has been
governed. Indeed, as justice Jackson noted, "[a] judge ... may be surprised
at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to con-
crete problems of executive power as they actually present themselves."
Id. at 659-60 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
27 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706.
28 22 U.S.C. § 1732.
29 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 30 specifically to
prevent such executive action,3 1 and thus as a measure incompatible
with the express or implied will of Congress,3 2 suspension of pending
claims with Iran should be strictly interpreted as authorized only if
part of the President's expressly delegated constitutional powers. The
Supreme Court held that "neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act
constitutes specific authorization of the President's [action]."-3 The
Court, however, granted that the IEEPA "delegates broad authority to
the President to act in times of national emergency" 34 and that the
executive action was implicitly approved by congressional acquies-
cence 35. Justice Rehnquist appealed to Justice Jackson's "zone of twi-
light" from Youngstown:
When the President acts in the absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own indepen-
dent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Con-
gress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quies-
cence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not
invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. 36
30 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
31 Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, 9-16, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981) (No. 80-2078).
In the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602, et seq.,
Congress, acting under its Article I powers, placed commercial claims of
American citizens against foreign states squarely within the jurisdiction of
federal district courts, and thereby removed the Executive from its historic
role in the resolution of such claims. The President's action here, removing
such claims from United States courts and transferring them to an interna-
tional forum, contravenes the express will of Congress.
Id. at 6-7.
32 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634.
33 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677. However, the IEEPA does contain language
that could be reasonably interpreted as authorizing the suspension of pending claims.
Title 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (a) (1) (B) authorizes the President to "nullify [and] void ...
exercising any right, power or privilege with respect to ... any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest. . . ." Invoking the jurisdiction
of the federal courts to enforce a party's rights and privileges attached to property
could be treated as "exercising any right, power or privilege with respect to ... any
property. .... " In fact, I think this is the correct interpretation of § 1702 in light of
the International Claims Settlement Act. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
This alternative interpretation does not, however, change the unconstitutional nature
of a unilateral executive suspension of Article III claims. See infra Part II.D.
34 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677.
35 Id.
36 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
2003]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Thus, the Court concluded that Congress had implicitly delegated the
authority to "terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts
involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran
and its state enterprises,. . . [and] prohibit all further litigation based
on such claims" to the Executive by acquiescing to the existence of a
concurrent "zone" of authority.37
The question nonetheless remained as to what "species" of power
such executive orders constituted. If the suspension of pending
claims was tantamount to modifying the jurisdiction of Article III
courts, then the "zone of twilight in which [the President] and Con-
gress . . . have concurrent authority"38 must include the "exceptions
power. ' 39 However, if the suspension of pending claims was analo-
gous to a quasi-legislative administrative action, then it was buttressed
by a considerable judicially-sanctioned tradition of congressional dele-
gation of such authority to the Executive. 40 Justice Rehnquist adopted
the latter interpretation of the executive action. The Court "posited
that the President did not modify federal court jurisdiction, but only
directed the courts to apply a different rule of law."41 The suspension
of pending claims was treated as a modification of the substantive law
compelling the settlement of the claims in the Claims Tribunal. As
support for this interpretation, Justice Rehnquist appealed both to the
decision in United States v. Schooner Peggy42 and the International
Claims Settlement Act of 194943 (ICSA).44 In Schooner Peggy, the Su-
37 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668-69.
38 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
39 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
40 See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (upholding President Harrison's author-
ity to unilaterally suspend import duty exemptions set by Congress based on the pow-
ers delegated to the Executive by the Tariff Act of 1890; holding that the Tariff Act
did not allocate congressional power to the Executive because the President was sim-
ply executing an Act of Congress, and was therefore not exercising a lawmaking func-
tion); see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991); Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
Sharon G. Hyman, Executive Agreements: Beyond Constitutional Limits?, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 805 (1983); Paul G. Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President, and the
Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REV. 141 (1952); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 369 (1989).
41 Anthony J. Colucci III, Note, Dames & Moore v. Regan: The Iranian Settlement
Agreements, Supreme Court Acquiescence to Broad Presidential Discretion, 31 CATH. U. L. REv.
565, 587-88 (1982); see also Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 684.
42 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). In Dames & Moore, Justice Rehnquist cited
Schooner Peggy to stand for the proposition that an action such as Executive Order No.
12,294 simply directed the courts to apply a different rule of law and did not modify
federal court jurisdiction. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 685.
43 22 U.S.C. § 1623(f) (2000).
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preme Court held that a treaty may amend substantive law without
violating separation of powers. 45 The International Claims Settlement
Act demonstrated that claims settlement is an example of executive
amendment to substantive law in the due course of executing an act
of Congress. 46 The constitutionality of the Schooner Peggy and ICSA
precedent has repeatedly been called into question by legal scholars, 47
but in practice the precedent is nonetheless "systematic [and]
unbroken."48
B. The Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society Standard
There is, however, a leap of logic between the premise that sus-
pension of all pending claims is approximate to claims settlement and
the conclusion that such suspension is merely a modification of sub-
stantive law. The current standard for determining what congres-
sional actions are modifications of law as opposed to actions under
the jurisdiction of the Executive orJudicial departments is articulated
in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society.49 Justice Thomas, delivering the
opinion for a unanimous Court, held that subsection (b) (6) (A) of the
44 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680 ("Crucial to our decision today is the conclu-
sion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by execu-
tive agreement. This is best demonstrated by Congress' enactment of the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.").
45 Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 109.
46 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680.
47 See, e.g., Colucci, supra note 41, at 588:
The [Dames & Moore] Court's review of closely related legislation, however,
lends little insight into how the foreign claims settlement power has been
defined in this regard. Through examination of the Hostage Act, the Inter-
national Claims Settlement Act, the IEEPA, and the FSIA, the only conclu-
sion drawn is that the President has the power to affect claims settlement.
The implication that this power entitles the President to override judicial
claims settlements is literally unsupported.
Id.; see also Hyman, supra note 40, at 807-08:
Our constitutional system of checks and balances under the doctrine of sep-
aration of powers requires that policymaking not be concentrated solely in
one branch of the federal government ... [I]ncreased concentration of the
foreign policymaking power in the hands of the Executive is contrary to the
spirit of the Constitution and is undemocratic. Presidential power in the
area of foreign affairs should not be permitted to expand at the expense of
Congress.
Id. at 807.
48 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952).
49 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
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Endangered Species Act of 197350 did not violate the separation of
powers doctrine by directing an outcome in pending litigation, al-
though specific claims were named in the subsection. 51 It is well-es-
tablished constitutional doctrine that the resolution of cases and
controversies is exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Article III
courts. 52 Under the separation of powers doctrine, Congress cannot
direct the Article III courts to make particular findings of fact or legal
conclusions. In Robertson, the Seattle Audubon Society claimed that
Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine by specifically
naming pending litigation as examples in a statute resolving certain
ambiguities in the Endangered Species Act. 53
The Robertson Court found that the language of the Act did not
instruct the courts on whether the pending litigation violated the old
provisions, but clarified and narrowed what should qualify as "ade-
quate consideration"5 4 under the old provisions. Two factors played
the principal roles in the Court's decision. First, the language of the
new provision referred to and replaced the legal standards of the
older provision. 55 Under the canon of interpretation that specific
provisions qualify general ones, the enactment of a specific legal stan-
dard for an existing legal requirement simply narrows the judicial ap-
plication of that requirement. 56 Second, it was significant to the
Robertson Court that the provision modified the existing law "clearly"57
and "explicitly."'58 Subsection (b) (6) (A) refers to the previous provi-
sions explicitly and expressly provides that its purpose is to furnish
standards for the existing statutory requirements.
The provisions of Executive Order No. 12,294, which provide for
the termination of "all legal proceedings in United States courts in-
volving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran
and its state enterprises, . . . [and] [the] prohibit[ion] [of] all further
litigation based on such claims," clearly fail to meet the Robertson stan-
50 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990,
§ 318, 103 Stat. 745. The Act is popularly known as the Northwest Timber
Compromise.
51 Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438.
52 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) ("It is evident
from this statement that the denial ofjurisdiction to this court, as well as to the Court
of Claims, is founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pend-
ing, prescribed by Congress.").
53 Robertson, 503 U.S. at 437.
54 Id. at 438.
55 Id. at 439-40.
56 See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978).
57 Robertson, 503 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added).
58 Id. (emphasis added).
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dard. Although Robertson deals exclusively with congressional modifi-
cation of substantive law, there is no reason to posit that a different
standard would apply to the Executive's "quasi-legislative" ftnction.
Executive Order No. 12,294 makes no reference to legal standards (as
that term was used by the Robertson Court) implicitly or explicitly. The
multifarious laws underlying the claims affected by the Order are ad-
dressed neither implicitly nor explicitly and would not be modified by
operation of the Order. According to the terms of the Executive Or-
der, the claims were to be redirected into an international tribunal,
which is not called upon in the Order to apply different law than
would have applied in the Article III courts. The Order expressly di-
rects the Article III courts to dismiss the litigation notwithstanding ap-
plicable legal standards.
C. Modifications to Jurisdiction and "Party-Based"Jurisdiction
The only "legal standards" that could have been implicitly modi-
fied (although it is unclear whether implicitness would satisfy the Rob-
ertson standard) by operation of Executive Order No. 12,294 would be
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (4),59 which defines the diversity jurisdiction of
U.S. courts over claims involving "a foreign state," and/or 28 U.S.C.
§1605(a) (2)-(3),60 exceptions to 28 U.S.C. § 1604 Foreign Sovereign
59 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (4) (2000). That section provides:
§ 1332. Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclu-
sive of interest and costs, and is between-
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this tide, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or of different States.
Id.
60 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2)-(3). That section provides:
§ 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in
issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property is pre-
sent in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on
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Immunity.6 1 Through § 1604 Congress exempted foreign sovereigns
from the jurisdiction of Article III courts except for those circum-
stances described in § 1605. The provisions of Title 28 are a vehicle by
which Congress delimits the boundaries of Article III jurisdiction. Al-
though these provisions of Title 28 are certainly "legal standards,"
their subject matter is purely jurisdictional in nature, and thus their
modification cannot be understood as a modification of a "legal stan-
dard" as that term was construed in Robertson. Furthermore, the 'Judi-
cial power of the United States" includes the power to decide six
"party-defined jurisdictional categories.."6 2 The power to decide which
of the six party-defined categories are heard by the Article III courts is
given to Congress in the exceptions power.6 3 The legal standard in
Executive Order No. 12,294 is purely party-defined and is thus, simi-
larly, a jurisdictional category. In fact, the last of the six party-defined
in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any property
exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instru-
mentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged
in a commercial activity in the United States.
Id.
61 28 U.S.C. § 1604. That section provides:
§ 1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States
except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
Id.
62 See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
FederalJurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rv. 205 (1985). Professor Amar proposes as part of his
two-tier theory of Article III jurisdiction that the language
to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party;-to Controver-
sies between two or more States;-between a State and a Citizen of another
State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or Citizen thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects ....
U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1, refers collectively to "party-defined" controversies to
which Congress may make "exceptions" under U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2. Amar,
supra, at 254-59. Professor Amar distinguishes these "party-defined" jurisdictional
categories from Article III "Cases," which he proposes may only be excepted to if at
least one inferior Article III tribunal is created that hasjurisdiction. Id. at 255. Essen-
tially, Professor Amar's two tiers are first, certain subject matter-defined cases, and
second, certain party-defined controversies. Id. at 240-59. Thus, as this Note argues,
any government action which regulates the access of those parties mentioned in Arti-
cle III, § 2, to Article III tribunals necessarily modifies the jurisdiction of the one
Supreme Court created by the Constitution and the inferior tribunals created by
Congress.
63 U.S. CoNsT. art III, § 2, cl. 2.
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jurisdictional categories is "Controversies ... between a State, or the
citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. ' 64 Just as
Congress made an exception to this basis for jurisdiction through 28
U.S.C. § 1604 Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Executive Order No.
12,294 made a wholesale exception for Iran from those circumstances
exempted from operation of § 1604 by § 1605(a)(2)-(3). 65 Thus, as a
purely party-defined limitation to the invocation of the jurisdiction of
United States courts, Executive Order No. 12,294 is unequivocally a
circumvention of Article III jurisdiction. Any exclusively party-based
denial of access to Article III courts must be interpreted as an exercise
of the "exceptions power" delegated to Congress in Article III of the
Constitution.66
II. THE DOCTRINE OF NONDELEGATION
The remaining question is the one Justice Rehnquist avoided by
characterizing the exercise of executive power as a modification of
law:67 is the exceptions power 68 within the "zone of twilight in which
[the President] and Congress . . .have concurrent authority"?69 May
Congress acquiesce, implicitly or explicitly, to sharing with the Execu-
tive the power to make exceptions to Article III jurisdiction? Concep-
tually, the constitutional grant of the exceptions power to Congress
entails a principle of nondelegation. 70 Under the nondelegation doc-
trine, Congress may not delegate its constitutionally-vested power to
another department, and complementarily, under the separation of
powers doctrine the other federal departments may not unilaterally
usurp Congress's constitutionally-vested powers.
64 Id.
65 See supra note 60.
66 C.f Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 684 (1981) (asserting that "[n]o
one would suggest that a determination of sovereign immunity divests the federal
corts of 'jurisdiction"').
67 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
68 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
69 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
70 See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 351
(14th ed. 2001). For more general discussions linking the doctrine of nondelegation
with separation of powers, see SOTIPos A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELE-
GATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 24 (1975); and Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1237 (1994) (connecting the nondelega-
tion doctrine with separation of powers); see also Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petro-
leum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
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In practice, Congress has frequently delegated rulemaking and
adjudicative functions71 to the executive branch that are analogous to
exercises of the legislative and judicial powers. In the area of interna-
tional agreements, the courts have predominantly upheld the consti-
tutionality of this type of delegation. 72 In Field v. Clark,73 the Supreme
Court upheld President Harrison's authority to unilaterally suspend
import duty exemptions set by Congress, based on the powers dele-
gated to the Executive by the Tariff Act of 1890.74 The Court avoided
the nondelegation issue by holding that the Tariff Act did not allocate
congressional power to the Executive because the President was sim-
ply executing an Act of Congress, and was therefore not actually exer-
cising a lawmaking function.
75
The holding in Field v. Clark reflects the modern approach to sep-
aration of powers and nondelegation questions in the context of inter-
national agreements. In the last century the courts have approached
the delegation issue from a progressively functional perspective, while
certain segments of the legal academy have adhered to a rather more
formal understanding of separation of powers. 76 Scholars such as Ar-
nold I. Burns and Stephen J. Markman have taken issue with a func-
tionalist interpretation of the "Sweeping Clause '77 as practically
71 See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10 (2d ed. 2001) ("When an
agency engages in rulemaking, it does something that looks very much like a legisla-
ture passing law .... When an agency engages in adjudication, it does something that
looks very much like a court deciding a case.").
72 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 70, at 351-52:
There are only two cases, both in the early 1930s, in which the Court found a
violation of the Nondelegation doctrine. In the Schechter Poultry case [295
U.S. 245 (1935)], the Court unanimously struck down the provision of the
National Industrial Recovery Act that authorized the President to approve
"codes of fair competition."... [a]nd in Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 3
88 (1935), the "hot oil" case, the Court struck down another provision of the
NIRA on delegation grounds.... Only rarely have dissenters urged that the
nondelegation doctrine be given sharper teeth. See, e.g.,Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in American Textile Mfr. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
Id.
73 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
74 Tariff Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 583.
75 Clark, 143 U.S. at 681-82.
76 For a discussion of theories of formalism and functionalism in the context of
separation of powers, see Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the
Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1994); and Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488 (1987).
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
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blurring the lines between governmental functions. 78 Burns and
Markman explain rather simply that "[the] division and enumeration
of powers establishes the fundamental terms by which one branch's
claim to authority may be deemed valid or invalid .... Our system of
government, properly viewed, is not, as one scholar has described it,
'separate institutions sharing powers."' 79
A. A Liberal View of the Modern Administrative State
It is fairly unproblematic to make a separation of powers and/or
nondelegation objection to the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 12,294 if one adopts the Burns and Markman view of the con-
straints of congressional authority to delegate power. However, a lib-
eral, functional view of the modern administrative state is reconcilable
with doctrines of separation of powers and nondelegation that rely on
formal, immutable principles of constitutional structure.
The Dames & Moore decision relied upon a functional and inter-
dependent understanding of government functions. The precedent to
which the Dames & Moore Court repeatedly alluded was Justice Jack-
son's famous concurrence in Youngstown.80 Justice Jackson described
the doctrine of separation of powers as enjoining upon the federal
branches "separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciproc-
ity."8 1 Although Justice Jackson denied that the President's role as
"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy"82 gave him blanket au-
thority to "do anything, anywhere,"8 3 Jackson did concede a remarka-
bly flexible "zone" of concurrent authority between the President and
Congress. In Mistretta v. United States,8 4 the Supreme Court followed
Justice Jackson's functional approach in Youngstown to reject nondele-
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.").
78 Arnold I. Burns & Stephen J. Markman, Understanding Separation of Powers, 7
PACE L. Rv. 575, 575-83 (1987). For the doctrinal underpinnings of this kind of
argument, see John Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Government, published in 1690,
where he wrote that "[the] power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a
positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative
can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other
hands." JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 75 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., 1980) (1690).
79 Burns & Markman, supra note 78, at 575-80.
80 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
81 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
82 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
83 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring).
84 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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gation and separation of powers challenges to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission.8 5 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Mistretta,
asserted that a "practical understanding [of] our increasingly complex
society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems,
[leads to the conclusion that] Congress simply cannot do its job ab-
sent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives. 8 6
Similarly, in Touby v. United States,17 the Supreme Court aban-
doned any traditional understanding of the principle of nondelega-
tion by holding that the Attorney General may practically define what
constitutes criminal conduct under the Controlled Substance Act 8 in
an effort to "assist" Congress without implicating constitutional dele-
gation problems.8 9 Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court,
explained that the nondelegation doctrine
does not prevent Congress from seeking assistance, within proper
limits, from its coordinate Branches. Thus, Congress does not vio-
late the Constitution merely because it legislates in broad terms,
leaving a certain degree of discretion to executive or judicial actors.
So long as Congress "lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is di-
rected to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delega-
tion of legislative power."90
After Touby it is difficult to discern permissible congressional requests
for assistance and forbidden delegations of legislative power. In an
effort to prevent doctrinal formalities from curtailing the actions of
government agencies, the Court has simply refused to apply a
nondelegation rationale instead of defining appropriate boundaries
to its application.9 1
Nowhere, however, has the nondelegation doctrine had as little
teeth as in the area of foreign affairs. In Dames & Moore, Justice Rehn-
quist appealed repeatedly to that famous precedent which implied
that, in the context of a national emergency or war, there is hardly any
85 The Commission was established by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified in scattered sections of 18 & 28
U.S.C.). The Commission is an independent arm of the judicial branch, but its mem-
bers are appointed and removable by the Executive branch, and its actions require
the advice and consent of the Senate.
86 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
87 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
88 Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
89 Touby, 500 U.S. at 164.
90 Id. at 165 (quotingJ.W. Hampton,Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928)) (citations omitted).
91 See supra Part I.B.
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executive action (within the scope of such an emergency) that would
encroach far enough on the province of the legislature and the courts
to render it unconstitutional. Ironically, in Youngstown,92 the major-
ity, led by Justice Black, held that President Truman's action was in
fact an example of this narrow category of impermissible executive
encroachment on Congress. 93 In the end though, the majority opin-
ion said little more than that if the President wishes to enjoin the un-
ions, he must do so according to the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Thus,
the only limitation to the executive action was that Congress did not
sanction it. The opinion, therefore, says very little about the limita-
tions on Congress's ability to sanction-and thereby delegate congres-
sional authority to-executive action.
The lasting impact of Youngstown for our present discussion
comes from Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, in which he details
three "somewhat over-simplified grouping[s] of practical situations in
which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers.
94
Justice Jackson fit President Truman's actions within the third group-
ing, which explained the legal consequences of an executive action
contrary to an act of Congress. 95 Justice Jackson agreed with Justice
Black .that, as Congress had legislated several times on the topic of
executive power in the area of economic emergency, and specifically
industry and union control, the President was bound to act within the
parameters of those legislative acts. 96 Significantly, Justice Jackson did
not say that the President was without power if his action conflicted
with the will of Congress, but rather that his power was at its "lowest
ebb." The implication is that the President has certain inherent pow-
ers that are not necessarily delineated in, but perhaps only implied by,
the Constitution.
In Dames & Moore, the majority relied on Justice Jackson's second
"grouping" of executive action from Youngstown, where he suggested
both that Congress and the Executive have certain concurrent powers,
and that Congress may waive through silence any objection to Presi-
92 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
93 Id. at 588.
94 Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
95 "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or im-
plied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the mat-
ter." Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
96 "It seems clearly eliminated from that class because Congress has not left
seizure of private property an open field but has covered it by three statutory policies
inconsistent with this seizure." Id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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dential exercise of these powers. 97 In Dames & Moore, and many other
foreign affairs powers cases, 98 this precedent has been interpreted to
mean that where the Court finds a concurrent zone of authority either
created by the Constitution and/or related congressional acts, con-
gressional silence will have the same legal effect as express delegation.
The tacit implication is that in this amorphous "zone of concurrent
authority," congressional delegation is relieved of the "clearly articu-
lated principle" standard established some thirty-nine years later in
Touby.9 9
The implication that there is no "clearly articulated principle
standard" in the concurrent zone of authority between the Executive
and Congress has been especially true of war and foreign affairs pow-
ers. For example, in Loving v. United States,100 Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority in an 8-1 decision, held that the President's unique
role as Commander in Chief gave him broad discretion in the area of
military affairs which made congressional guidance on the criteria im-
posed by military tribunals for a death penalty sentence unneces-
sary. 10 1 Justice Kennedy wrote that "delegations [which call] for the
exercise ofjudgment or discretion that lies beyond the traditional au-
thority of the President" would fail to provide guiding principles in
violation of the nondelegation doctrine. 10 2 Explication of the issue
was unnecessary because the Court found that the Executive Order in
question lay within the traditional authority of the President. The
Court in Loving used the term "traditional authority" to mean effec-
tively the same thing as the inherent presidential authority suggested
by Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown.' 03 The general un-
willingness of the Supreme Court to disturb the administration of leg-
islation through agencies or the exercise of presidential foreign affairs
97 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981).
98 See Orvis v. Brownell, 345 U.S. 183 (1954); Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 105
(1801); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800 (1st
Cir. 1981); Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1951); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: POWER TO WAIVER OR
SETTLE CLAIMS § 213 (1965).
99 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
100 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
101 Id. at 761.
102 Id. at 772.
103 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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powers has effectually rendered the nondelegation doctrine-to use
the word chosen by several legal scholars- "toothless."
10 4
The search for limiting principles in the area of congressional
delegation does not, however, lack a chorus of dissenting voices. Jus-
tice Scalia, dissenting in Mistretta, reminded his dismayed audience of
structural formalists that "[i] t is difficult to imagine a principle more
essential to democratic government than that upon which the doc-
trine of unconstitutional delegation is founded." 10 5 Regrettably, Jus-
tice Scalia failed to distinguish the fundamental nature of the
nondelegation doctrine from its ineffectual application by the Court
and concludes that it is "not . . . readily enforceable by the courts,"
because it has become a "debate not over a point of principle but
over a question of degree."'0 6 However, Justice Scalia goes on to
make a powerful argument suggesting that impermissible delegation
should not be a question of degree:
Today's decision follows the regrettable tendency of our recent sep-
aration-of-powers jurisprudence . . . to treat the Constitution as
though it were no more than a generalized prescription that the
functions of the Branches should not be commingled too much-
how much is too much to be determined, case-by-case, by this
Court. The Constitution is not that. Rather, as its name suggests, it
is a prescribed structure, a framework, for the conduct of
government.10
7
Although Justice Scalia conceded in the subsequent portion of his dis-
sent that this structural framework is blurred at its boundaries, he re-
fused to sanction an understanding of delegation which did no more
than allow the Court to make ad hoc determinations about whether a
particular delegation looked like it commingled government func-
tions too much.
Similarly, eight years before Mistretta, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
concurring in the judgment in Industrial Union Department v. American
Petroleum ("The Benzene Case"),1081 stated that the plurality should
have struck down § 6(b) (5) of the Occupation Safety and Health Act
104 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David
Schoenbrod, 20 CARDozo L. REV. 775 (1999); Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt,
Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the
Regulated Community as a Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 479 (1995).
105 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
108 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
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(OSHA) 1 09 on nondelegation grounds.I 10 The ChiefJustice wrote that
the briefs of the parties and opinions of his fellow Justices demon-
strated that "Congress, the governmental body best suited and most
obligated to make the choice confronting us in this litigation, ha[d]
improperly delegated that choice to the Secretary of Labor and, deriv-
atively, to this Court." 'I Justice Rehnquist then outlined a brief his-
tory of the nondelegation doctrine and identified the judicial shift
during the New Deal as the point at which "the principle that Con-
gress could not simply transfer its legislative authority to the Executive
fell under a cloud."'1 12 However, like Justice Scalia in Mistretta, Justice
Rehnquist refused to couch his nondelegation objection in formal
terms, but instead appealed to the principle articulated by Chief Jus-
tice Taft that delegations of legislative authority must be judged "ac-
cording to common sense and the inherent necessities of the
governmental co-ordination."' 13
The objections of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia si-
multaneously recognize that a modern administrative state requires
limiting principles of delegation to be considered against a back-
ground of agency principles, and leave the sympathetic reader with
the sense that some essential character of the nondelegation doctrine
is yet discoverable and somewhere applicable. This impression is the
result of the nondelegation doctrine functioning on two levels. The
nondelegation inquiry in both Mistretta and American Petroleum ask:
what are the legislative or judicial or executive powers? The question
is essentially the content of each constitutional power. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia adopt seemingly functional interpreta-
tions of this "what is the power?" question, because no matter how
strictly one proposes a principle of nondelegation be applied to gov-
ernment action, one cannot escape the "Venn Diagram" created by an
inventory of those powers the Court has sanctioned under each
branch.
109 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2000).
110 Am. Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
111 Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
112 Id. at 674 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
113 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
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FIGURE 1. VENN DIAGRAM OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY
Executive Legislative
Judicial
Figure 1 is a rather simplistic illustration of the tension created by
an approach to delegation questions that treats the powers of each
branch as finite and exclusive fields. Certainly the legislative branch
cannot delegate to the Executive a power or privilege that both enjoy.
James Madison defended just such a model of federal power when he
wrote in Federalist No. 47 that separation of powers "does not mean
that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control
over, the acts of each other."114 Therein lies the other side of the
principle of nondelegation: the control of each branch over the
others. The question of what partial agency each branch may have in
another must be answered through a diagram like Figure 1 and is ap-
propriately dealt with through an analytical framework like that cur-
rently used in "excessive delegation" cases. 115 However, the question
114 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison believed that Montesquieu's conception of separation of powers was only
that when the "whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free
constitution are subverted." Id. at 302-03. Cf, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 426 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his Mistretta dissent, Justice Scalia stated
that Madison's point in Federalist No. 47 was
that the commingling specifically provided for in the structure that he and
his colleagues had designed-the Presidential veto over legislation, the Sen-
ate's confirmation of executive and judicial officers, the Senate's ratification
of treaties, the Congress' power to impeach and remove executive and judi-
cial officers-did not violate a proper understanding of separation of
powers.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115 As Justice Scalia explained in Mistretta:
[T]he focus of the controversy, in the long line of our so-called excessive
delegation cases, has been whether the degree of generality contained in the
authorization for exercise of executive orjudicial powers in a particular field
is so unacceptably high as to amount to a delegation of legislative powers.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of the control of each branch over the others-i.e., the constitutionally
vested power of each branch to delimit and/or expand the scope of
the other branches' authority-is not a "debate of degree." The ques-
tion of the control of each branch over the others, which I will refer to
as the 'jurisdictional question," is a structural principle to which
Madison's "commingling" model is inapplicable. A more appropriate
analysis for the 'Jurisdictional question" can be derived from the Su-
preme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence. The remainder of
this Note is dedicated to developing this analytical model.
B. Limitations on Congress's Authority to Delegate Power
The most common Supreme Court cases for which an excessive
delegation argument succeeded are those in which the Court found
that Congress had created a statutory scheme that either sought to or
had the indirect result of aggrandizing its own power. In cases such as
Bowsher v. Synar, 1 6 INS v. Chadha,1 17 Clinton v. City of New York, 118 and
116 478 U.S. 714 (1986). In Bowsher, Justice Burger, writing for the majority, ar-
ticulated one clear and important limit on the removal power: Congress cannot give
itself the power to remove executive officials by any process other than impeachment.
Id. at 726. The Court therefore held the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit. II, 99 Stat. 1038, unconstitutional on the
grounds that Congress could not retain removal power of the Comptroller General,
thereby insulating him from executive control and charging him with exercising exec-
utive power. Id. at 734.
117 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In Chadha, Justice Burger, writing for the majority, held
that Congress and the Executive may not pass into law a bill that waives the right of
the President and the Senate to review the certain legislative actions by the House of
Representatives in the area of immigration and naturalization. Id. at 959. The Court
stated that, without exception, the bicameralism and presentment requirements are
non-waiveable. Id. at 958. The House of Representatives cannot exercise "legislative
Powers," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, without adhering to the constitutionally prescribed
structure. Id. at 957.
118 524 U.S. 417 (1998). In Clinton v. City of New York, Justice Stevens, writing for
the majority, held that Congress may not delegate to the Executive the authority to
veto certain monetary provisions in a duly enacted law without being subject to a two-
thirds override by Congress. Id. at 439. Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Breyer dis-
sented, maintaining that the line-item veto was no broader a delegation of Presiden-
tial execution of the spending laws than the suspension power of the Tariff Act of
1890 upheld in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). Id. at 464-65 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). The majority responded that, unlike the President's "power to suspend exemp-
tions from import duties" under provisions of the Tariff Act of 1890, "[the] power to
cancel portions of a duly enacted statute" involves greater presidential discretion.
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 443-44. Conversely, compare the Court's reasoning in Clinton v.
City of New York with the practice of Executive Agreements that function legally as
treaties, but do not require the advice and consent of the Senate. Again we see how
flexible the Court has been in the area of foreign affairs.
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Buckley v. Valeo, 1 19 the Supreme Court has not hesitated to deny that
Congress's implicit authority to delegate power, however broadly in-
terpreted, cannot be wielded in such a fashion that it compromises
the procedural requirements set out in the Constitution to safeguard
the structural balance of power between the separate, yet interdepen-
dent, branches. At the same time, cases such as Mistretta v. United
States,120  United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export,'2 1 Loving v. United
States,122 and Morrison v. Olson,123 instruct us that Congress may
broadly delegate "quasi-" legislative, 124 "quasi-" executive, and "quasi-"
judicial powers to administrative bodies designed to execute congres-
sional acts.
The present challenge is to articulate a principle that distin-
guishes those cases the Supreme Court has found emblematic of the
inalienable structural requirements of the Constitution from those
119 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held unconsti-
tutional a federal law that empowered the Speaker of the House and the President
pro tempore of the Senate to appoint members of the Federal Election Commission.
The Court explained that, if Federal Elections Commission (FEC) personnel exer-
cised authority that made them "Officers of the United States," they could only be
appointed by the President in accordance with the Appointments Clause, but if the
FEC personnel were "inferior Officers," then Congress could delegate their appoint-
ment to courts of law or heads of departments, but not to itself. Id. at 132.
120 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
121 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, upheld a
1934 Joint Resolution of Congress authorizing President Roosevelt to initiate arms
embargoes against certain countries. The Court simply rejected petitioner Curtiss-
Wright's non-delegation objection with an ambiguous proclamation about the Presi-
dent's unique power to "speak or listen as a representative of a nation." Id. at 319.
Even as the Court was willing to repeatedly strike down provisions of the NIRA (Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act) on delegation grounds, see SULLIVAN & GUNTHER,
supra note 70, at 351, it was unwilling to apply the doctrine in the context of foreign
affairs.
122 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
123 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, upheld the
constitutionality of the independent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824. Id. at 696-97. The Court distinguished
Bowsher v. Synar, see supra note 116, on the ground that although Congress restricted
the Executive's ability to remove the independent counsel, Congress had no role in
the removal. Id. at 686. Justice Scalia dissented, concluding that prosecution and
investigation are purely executive powers and thus a statute which vests these powers
in a person who is not removable by the Executive is void. Id. at 706 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
124 A term used by the Court to distinguish agency action from "purely" legislative
and judicial powers. See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. South Carolina State Port Au-
thority, 535 U.S. 743, 774 (2002) ("The terms 'quasi legislative' and 'quasi adjudica-
tive' indicate that the agency uses legislative like or court like procedures but that it is
not, constitutionally speaking, either a legislature or a court.").
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where Congress has broad authority to delegate power. According to
Supreme Court jurisprudence, Congress cannot: (1) delegate new
powers to itself;125 (2) relieve itself from the bicameralism and pre-
sentment requirements; 126 (3) relieve itself from the supermajority re-
quirement to override a veto; 127 (4) delegate to the Executive or its
agencies the authority to amend or repeal duly enacted law;128 (5)
delegate executive functions to an officer removable by Congress; 29
or (6) delegate executive or quasi-judicial tasks to an agency with a
majority of congressionally appointed personnel. 130 These limitations
on Congress's ability to delegate power share certain clear structural
principles. Loosely, the structural principles at issue are: (1) bicamer-
alism; (2) presentment; (3) removal; and (4) appointment.
The Supreme Court has approached a distinct majority of the
cases in which it struck down a legislative scheme for having violated
the previously-mentioned constitutional structural requirements not
as impermissibly vague congressional delegations, but as instances of
Congress attempting to aggrandize its own power. However, consis-
tent structural principles must apply where Congress attempts to abdi-
cate power that functions as a "control over the acts" of another
branch.13 1 Unlike those constitutional powers that lend themselves to
"partial agency" in the other branches of government, constitutionally
vested powers that are designed to control the scope of a co-equal
branch's authority are nondelegable.132
For example, although Congress may delegate quasi-legislative
powers to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate
environmental regulations, it cannot delegate to the EPA the power to
amend duly enacted environmental law. So why is it that the EPA
may, in all practicality, "legislate" about the environment, but it may
not affect the legislation about the environment that Congress has en-
acted? The difference lies in the fact that the latter threatens the
structural interdependence of the three federal branches whereas the
former does not; the structure prescribed in the Constitution for en-
acting law is in itself a delegation of power to each house of Congress
and to the President to prescribe the control of each branch over the
125 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
126 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
127 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
128 Id.
129 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
130 Id.
131 THE FEDERALISTNo. 47, supra note 114, at 302 (James Madison). See supra note
114 and accompanying text.
132 Id. See also supra note 114 and accompanying text; supra Figure 1.
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others. Congress may always legislate to counteract something that
the EPA has done that it does not like (i.e., does not meet with popu-
lar approval), and the President may then veto that legislation in the
interest of the executive agency, and then Congress may override that
veto if it can rally a supermajority. In sum, each branch of the federal
government is the exclusive executor of certain structural powers re-
ferred to by James Madison as "checks."13 3 Congress cannot delegate
away its "checks" to the other branches, just as surely as it cannot dele-
gate to itself the checking powers of the other branches. As explained
in Part II.A., each branch's exclusive 'Jurisdictional" powers control
the scope of the authority of the other branches. Cases such as Bow-
sher, Chadha, Clinton, and Buckley begin to give content to this catego-
rization of constitutional powers, and Chadha in particular suggests
why traditional nondelegation analysis is inept-because it fails to dif-
ferentiate between "partial agency" powers and 'jurisdictional"
powers.
C. A Proposal for a Judicially Manageable Nondelegation Doctrine
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Mistretta,
"debate over unconstitutional delegation [has become] a debate not
over a point of principle but over a question of degree."'1 4 The fact is
that it is difficult to even characterize this question of limits on delega-
tion as a "doctrine," when the courts have rendered it functionally
ineffectual and the scholars grappling with this ineffectuality cannot
formulate any principles coherent enough to allow for doctrinal judi-
cial application. However, although few deny that "separation of pow-
ers" necessarily entails some concept of nondelegation, 1 35 no one can
seem to agree on how or even whether the Constitution constrains
congressional reallocation of those "separate" powers. If constraints
exist, do they only apply if the power is "important" enough? Or if the
delegation is "ambiguous" enough? Or must it be both?
In Wayman v. Southard,136 Chief Justice Marshall explained that
133 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 114, at 311 (James Madison). ("An elective
despotism was not the government we fought for; but one in which the powers of gov-
ernment should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistry, as that
no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and re-
strained by others.").
134 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135 Cf Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 1721 (arguing that a statutory grant
of authority to the executive branch or other agents never effects a delegation of
legislative power.)
136 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
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[t]he line has not been exactly drawn which separates those impor-
tant subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature it-
self, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be
made, and power given to those who are to act under such general
provisions to fill up the details. 1
3 7
Marshall thus proposed constraints on delegation determined by a
constitutional line drawn between "important subjects" and "[sub-
jects] of less interest." The obvious criticism to this argument was
made in Synar v. United States.13 8 The plaintiffs in Synar appealed di-
rectly to Justice Marshall's rationale from Wayman to buttress their
argument that certain features of the Balanced Budget and Emer-
gency Deficit Control Act of 1985139 delegated to the Executive the
type of authority that is "'so central to the legislative function' that it
may not be delegated. ' 140 The D.C. District Court rejected this argu-
ment on the grounds that 'judicial adoption of a 'core functions' anal-
ysis would be effectively standardless. No constitutional provision
distinguishes between 'core' and 'non-core' legislative functions, so
that the line would necessarily have to be drawn on the basis of the
court's own perceptions of the relative importance of various legisla-
tive functions.' '1 4 1
Professor Martin Redish articulates a doctrine of nondelegation
based on what he terms the "political commitment" principle. 1 42 Pro-
fessor Redish explains that Congress may delegate rulemaking and ad-
judicative choices to the other branches, so long as those choices are
necessary to "ensure the political responsibility contemplated by the
Constitution's scheme of representation. 1 43 The relevant inquiry
under Professor Redish's model is thus whether a particular delega-
tion is so vague that it creates an accountability problem.' 44 Redish's
model draws a constitutional distinction between delegations that clar-
ify lines of causation between government action and the responsible
actors, and those delegations that blur such causative lines. The elec-
torate's ability to determine causation is the essence of "political re-
sponsibility." Thus, impermissible delegations of authority are those
that are too vague for the electorate to determine which consequent
137 Id. at 43.
138 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986), affd, 478 U.S. 714.
139 2 U.S.C. §§ 900-907, 922 (2000).
140 Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1385.
141 Id.
142 MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION As POLITICAL STRUCTURE 137 (1995).
143 Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REv. 327, 375 (2002)
(discussing Redish's political commitment principle).
144 REDISH, supra note 142, at 143.
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actions derive from the delegation. However, in practice, "vagueness"
analysis has proven to be nearly as "standardless" as the D.C. District
Court cautions application of Chief Justice Marshall's "core functions"
analysis would be. For example, in American Petroleum, Justice Stevens,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Stewart, explained that if the
Government was correct that neither § 3(8) nor § 6(b) (5) of OSHA
required findings upon which the Secretary of Labor would deter-
mine classifications of toxic substances, the Act itself would "make
such a 'sweeping delegation of legislative power' that it might be un-
constitutional.' 1 45 As is evident from the various positions taken by
the Justices on this point in American Petroleum, the qualification of a
particular delegation as "too vague," "too broad," or "too sweeping" is
inevitably the product of backward reasoning. 146
There are certain significant consistencies between the various
formulations of the nondelegation doctrine 47 that, taken together,
present a useful, yet loose, set of guidelines.' 4 The inquiry under this
combined model is roughly whether the delegating branch (almost
invariably Congress) has (1) delegated a power that it possessed and
thus had the authority to give away, 149 and (2) constrained the scope
of that delegation in such a way that (a) it retains the ultimate author-
145 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980).
146 The paradigmatic example of this kind of reasoning is Chief'Justice Marshall's
statements in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825), to the effect
that-in the words of Gary Lawson-"the Constitution requires Congress to make
whatever decisions are important enough so that the Constitution requires Congress
to make them." LAWSON, supra note 71, at 114. However, Lawson's formulation of
the nondelegation doctrine falls victim to the same circular reasoning when he pro-
poses that "Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important
to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them." Lawson, supra
note 70, at 1239.
147 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (arguing that the constitutionality
of a particular delegation can be determined by reference to the ability of its specific
terms to resolve cases brought under the statute authorizing the delegation). Essen-
tially, the statute must lay out the constraints on the delegation plainly enough for an
interested person to determine what is legally allowed under the statutory scheme. Id.
at 183; see also LAWSON, supra note 71, at 115 (explaining that the ultimate inquiry is
"whether a statute vesting discretion in administrators would have been viewed by the
late 18th-century public as a 'proper' exercise of legislative (and executive) authority,
and is therefore authorized by the sweeping clause"). Professor Lawson proposes that
"'Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important to the stat-
utory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them.'" LAWSON, supra iiote 71, at
115 (quoting Lawson, supra note 70, at 1239).
148 However, this combined model suffers from the same problems in application.
149 See, e.g., Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.), at 42-43 ("It will not be contended that
Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are
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ity in that area ("core functions" would be those powers which are not
amenable to constrained delegation), and (b) the scope of that au-
thority is knowable to both the electorate and to the courts.
In practice, the multi-prong inquiry above is generally asked in
one sweeping inquiry based on the ad hoc determination of the focus
of each particular delegation challenge. For example, in Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass'ns,150 J. W Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,15 1
and Mistretta v. United States,15 2 (among others) the Supreme Court
applied an "intelligible principle" standard 153 to delegation chal-
lenges. Some scholars have treated judicial attempts to articulate the
meaning of the nondelegation doctrine, such as the "intelligible prin-
ciples" standard, as inexact if not unfaithful applications of the consti-
tutional principle.' 54 Scholars such as John Hart Ely have identified
this gulf between judicially created standards and the constitutional
principle as the death knell of the nondelegation doctrine.155 Con-
versely, Professor Cass Sunstein explains that the standards articulated
in cases have not murdered the doctrine, but that the doctrine has
merely been "relocated"' 5 6 in these standards, which he refers to as
"nondelegation canons." Professor Sunstein maintains that, "[t]he
nondelegation canons are far preferable to the old nondelegation
doctrine, because they are subject to principled judicial application,
and because they do not threaten to unsettle so much of modern
government."157
Professor Sunstein's "nondelegation canons," which are loosely
synonymous with the two-part inquiry this Note designates the "coin-
strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others, pow-
ers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.").
150 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
151 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
152 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
153 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, held
that, "when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must
'lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body au-
thorized to [act] is directed to conform."' Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (quoting J. W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409).
154 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Wertkin, Note, Reintroducing Compromise to the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 90 GEO. L. J. 1055, 1055 (2002) (arguing that the "disconnect between legal
principle and application reflects a flawed, inconsonant approach to the nondelega-
tion doctrine that obscures basic constitutional concerns of accountability and separa-
tion of powers").
155 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 132-33 (1980) (asserting that the
nondelegation doctrine is dead).
156 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315-16 (2000)
(asserting that the doctrine is alive and well, "relocated rather than abandoned").
157 Id.
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bined model," reflect a practical understanding of our increasingly
complex society, and maintain the spirit of the constitutional princi-
ple. However, the "disconnect"158 some scholars observe between
such a view of nondelegation and the inalienable nature of the consti-
tutional structure is not a function of surrendering the latter to a func-
tional understanding of delegation, but rather a misunderstanding of
the dual nature of constitutional power. The "nondelegation canons"
that have developed in the context of administrative law account for
the relationship of Congress to those constitutional powers that are
conducive to "partial agency" as described in Part II.A. Article I vests
Congress with the power to "make all Laws." 159 In operation, the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause allows (and even directs) Congress to use
the other branches as its agents to give life to the law. In principle,
Sunstein's "canons of nondelegation" create limiting principles for
how Congress may act through the agency of the other branches: (1)
Congress can only delegate to its agent what it may itself do; (2) if the
other branch is to act as Congress's agent, it follows that Congress
must retain its status as principal; and (3) the actions of the agent
cannot bind third parties unless the scope of its agency is knowable to
those parties. If the functional interpretation of the nondelegation
doctrine in the context of "partial agency" powers were approached
from this perspective, common law principles would guide just and
coherent application of the doctrine.
However, this formulation of nondelegation does not work in the
context of those constitutional powers designed to control the scope
of a co-equal branch's authority. 160 These powers are per se
nondelegable.
By separating "partial agency" powers from "scope of authority"
powers we are able to reconcile that which Justice Scalia did not: that
the Constitution is a "prescribed structure, a framework, for the con-
duct of government" and that "commingling of functions" as con-
ceived by the Framers cannot seem to be contained by any formal
principle.
D. The Exceptions Power and Nondelegation
Significantly, the Court in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society im-
plied that a congressional action which "purported to direct any par-
ticular findings of fact or applications of law, old or new, to fact,"1 61
158 See Wertkin, supra note 154, at 1055.
159 U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, c. 18.
160 See supra Part II.A.
161 503 U.S. 429, 438 (1992).
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would have violated Article III of the Constitution by infringing upon
the 'Judicial Power" 162 vested exclusively in the courts. The imper-
missible "congressional direction of judicial decision-making" scena-
rio is directly analogous to the example given about the EPA. 1
63
Congress directing the outcome of pending litigation in the Article III
courts would functionally usurp the courts' jurisdictional power to ad-
judicate cases and controversies. The courts would cease to be a co-
equal branch of government and would instead be agents of Congress.
Similarly, an executive action that removes certain parties from
the jurisdiction of the Article III courts would infringe upon Con-
gress's authority to make "exceptions"'164 to the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court and to constitute inferior Article III courts.'65
The constitutional power of Congress to define the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court and constitute inferior courts is the para-
digmatic example of a 'jurisdictional power" as described in Part II.B.
Congress alone can define the scope of the 'Judicial Power" beyond
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and thus Congress
alone can create subject matter or party-defined exceptions to Article
III cases and controversies. If the "exceptions power" were within the
"twilight zone"166 of concurrent authority between the Executive and
Congress, then the Executive could unilaterally decide how, if, and
when it would execute the laws. For example, an executive adminis-
tration that disagreed ideologically with the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act of 1994,167 could simply remove parties injured
under the Act from the jurisdiction of the courts and thereby frustrate
the purpose of the law. This outcome is clearly irreconcilable with the
constitutional structure of American government. For the same rea-
son, cases like Seattle Audubon and Klein demonstrate that Congress's
power to define and redefine the cases and controversies within the
jurisdiction of the Article III courts must fall short of a power to "di-
rect. any particular findings of fact or applications of law, old or new,
to fact"'168 in the courts.
Both the text and structure of Article III and the historical exer-
cise of the powers defined therein support the conclusion that the
"Exceptions Power" is a structural principle like bicameralism, pre-
162 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
163 See supra Part II.B.
164 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
166 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
167 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000).
168 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871); supra note 52.
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sentment, appointment, and removal. Article III, section 2 begins with
"Thejudicial Power shall extend to.. ."169 -meaning that this section
defines the scope of the 'Judicial Power." Thus, "with such Excep-
tions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make,"'170 is in
reference to the scope of power of the Article III courts. Article III,
section 2, therefore, grants Congress the power to define the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Article I, section 8 grants Con-
gress the power "to constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court." 171 The necessary implication is that Congress has the power
to define the jurisdiction of the inferior courts. Thus Congress is con-
stitutionally exclusively responsible for the scope of power for all Arti-
cle III courts.
Congress has taken full advantage of its exceptions power, for ex-
ample, through the creation of specialized administrative adjudicative
bodies, the provisions of Title 28, and limitations imposed on courts'
ability to hear and grant habeas petitions.1 72 Part I.C. explained how
Congress codified exceptions from Article III jurisdiction for foreign
sovereigns and specific exclusions from that general immunity in Title
28. Claims such as that of Dames & Moore were only hearable in Arti-
cle III courts by virtue of the statutory exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity173 created by Congress. The removal of that litigation from
the courts by Executive Order 12,294 modified the jurisdictional
scheme created by Congress.
Because the "exceptions power" is a structural principle like bi-
cameralism, presentment, removal, and appointment, 7 4 it should not
be administered through executive order. Such a 'jurisdictional
power" is not exercisable by a coordinate branch, nor is it delegable
by the branch charged with its exercise. To delegate the "exceptions
power" to the Executive would concentrate 'Jurisdictional power" in
the Executive, dangerously disrupting the balance between the co-
equal branches of government. There is, therefore, no way to legiti-
mate the provisions of Executive Order No. 12,294 which removed
pending litigation from the Article III courts and vested this litigation
in international tribunals. Only Congress has the power to shift juris-
diction from federal courts to international courts. Executive Order
169 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
170 Id.
171 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
172 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214.
173 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000).
174 See discussion supra Part II.B.
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No. 12,294 thus violated the letter, structure, and history of our consti-
tutional system.
CONCLUSION
Based on her research into the constitutional limits of Executive
Agreements such as the Algiers Accords, Professor Sharon Hyman re-
ported that "Congress ... has expressed concern that its powers are
being eroded by the extensive use of the international agreement by
the executive branch .... ,,175 In the sensitive field of foreign affairs, it
is particularly important that Congress and the Executive properly bal-
ance their authority. Improper delegation compromises important
decisionmaking procedures and accountability that are vital to pro-
tecting individual rights during times of national emergency. Profes-
sor Harold Koh maintains that the Iran-Contra Affair is an example of
this sort of procedural and accountability failure due to poor delega-
tion decisions on the part of Congress. Professor Koh writes that the
Dames & Moore decision "condoned legislative inactivity at a time that
demanded interbranch dialogue and bipartisan consensus. 1 76 In the
context of the Bush Administration's "War on Terrorism" it is not es-
pecially difficult to see how inattention to the delegation decisions of
Congress might be regrettable in the future. The outrage by mem-
bers of the practicing and academic legal communities over President
Bush's November 13, 2001 Military Order 177 granting the Secretary of
Defense broad powers to create military commissions for the deten-
tion and (presumably) the prosecution of persons the Executive uni-
laterally named as subject to the order, demonstrates how the
changing nature of national emergencies requires immediate consid-
eration and resolution of the constitutional delegation questions at
issue.
Increasingly, our domestic policy is inseparable from interna-
tional policy and agreements. It is unrealistic to assume that condon-
175 Sharon G. Hyman, Executive Agreements: Beyond Constitutional Limits?, 11 HaF-
sTRA L. REV. 805, 807 (1983) (citing Congressional Review of International Agreements:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on
Int'l Relations, 94th Cong. (1976); Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements-i 975:
Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975); Congressional Oversight of Executive Agree-
ments-1972: Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. (1972)).
176 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 140 (1990).
177 Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism §§ 3(a), 4(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
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ing broad exercise of functionally limitless executive powers in the
context of foreign affairs will not profoundly affect individual rights
(both personal and property) domestically. The Dames & Moore deci-
sion as precedent suggests that the Executive could deny all individu-
als whose personal or property rights were violated by the current
administration's "War on Terrorism" access to Article III courts, so
long as Congress were to "acquiesce" to such an exercise of power,
and perhaps even if Congress vocally disapproved. A generation ago,
Justice Frankfurter recognized how truly fine the line was between the
ability to delegate authority and a dangerous concentration of author-
ity, when he wrote:
[The Framers] rested the structure of our central government on
the system of checks and balances .... Not so long ago it was
fashionable to find [that] system of checks and balances obstructive
to effective government. It was easy to ridicule that system as out-
moded-too easy. The experience for which the world has passed
in our own day has made vivid the realization that the [Framers]
were not inexperienced doctrinaires.178
The reference is, recognizably, to the rise of the Nazi party in Ger-
many. The allusion may seem dramatic, but we must remember that
the "Post September 11th Era" is still too new for thoughtful reflec-
tion. Concurring with Justice Frankfurter's opinion, Justice Jackson
wrote that in the area of national security, "any actual test of [execu-
tive] power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and con-
temporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law."1 79
Perhaps it is worth considering whether Justice Jackson's "imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables"1 8 ' might be the same as
those "fashionable"' 8 1 practices which Justice Frankfurter reminds us
paved the way for fascism. One can agree that the "great ordinances
of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and
white,"'18 2 without conceding that those "great ordinances" fail to
make inalienable any power of the separately established branches of
government. The Constitution was intended to be a self-paternalistic
contract specifically because the Framers recognized that adherence
to "abstract theories of law"-what might be better termed "princi-
178 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
179 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
180 Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
181 Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
182 Id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands,
277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes,J., dissenting)).
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ples"-when inconvenient or unpopular is the purpose of a Constitu-
tional system.
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, Justice Rehnquist cited United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., where the Court noted:
[W]e are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the
President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an au-
thority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations-a power which does not require as a basis
for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every
other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to
the applicable provisions of the Constitution. 8 3
A constitutional interpretation that allows the Executive to mod-
ify the jurisdiction of the Article III courts would insulate the Execu-
tive from accountability to the judicial and legislative branches. Thus,
the Dames & Moore decision, and the executive unaccountability
which it invites, exposes the problematic weaknesses in the current
interpretation of constitutional principles "vital to the integrity and
maintenance of"' 18 4 our system of government. The nondelegation
doctrine proposed in this Note, based on a dual understanding of
constitutional powers, is offered as a foundation for canons of consti-
tutional interpretation designed to protect our democracy in the Post-
September l1th Era.
183 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (citations omitted).
184 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
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